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not contemplate extending coverage of the new rules to retrials.
However, confusion will continue to exist until the problem disappears
with the passage of time or at least until the United States Supreme
Court provides definite guidelines.
BiLLY JOE TSINGER

EXPERT OPINION FROM THE DEFENDANT-PHYSICIAN
Nearly every state has a statute allowing a litigant to call an adverse
party to testify to "facts within his knowledge," that is, to what he
actually saw and did.1 In medical malpractice suits, however, the question arises whether an adverse witness may be required under the
statute to testify not only to what he saw and did but also to whether
his actions deviated from the accepted standard of medical practice
in the community, testimony considered as "expert opinion." Most
adverse witness statutes do not expressly prohibit one party from using
the other as his expert witness. 2 While recognizing the right of a
plaintiff in a malpractice action to call the defendant-physician as a witness, some courts have limited the testimony which may be elicited
from such a witness to "non-expert opinion" testimony.3 Other courts
allow free and complete questioning just as if the witness had been
4
called as an expert under ordinary circumstances.
CIV. PRO.

CODE § 2055 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 52-178 (1958);
§ 154-1-16 (1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 222-27 (1955); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 9-12o6 (1967); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11o, § 6o (Smith-Hurd 1958); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 2-1728 (1958); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-243 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art.
35, § 9 (1965); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233:22 (1956); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2161
(1962); IMINN. STAT. § 595.03 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1710 (1943); MO. R]v. STAT.
§ 491.030 (1959); M.R. Crv. P., Rule 43(b) (ig6i); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 516 § 24
(1947); N.J. RE'. STAT. § zA:81-ii (1937); NROP 4 3 (b) (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-50 (1953); OHio 'REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.07 (Baldwin 1966); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 383 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 324 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-501 (1962);
CAL.

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1641 (1958); VA CODE ANN. § 8-291 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 885.14 (1961); and also, FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (b).
-See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-178 (1958), "Any party to a civil action
or probate proceeding may compel an adverse party, or any person for whose
benefit such action or proceeding is instituted, prosecuted or defended, to testify
as a witness in his behalf, in the same manner and subject to the same rules as
other witnesses, and he may examine such party to the same extent as an adverse
witness."
-'Eg., Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913); Ericksen v. Wilson,
266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53
(Ct. App. 1944).
'E.g., Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Dark v. Fetzer,
6 Mich. App. 308, 149 N.W.2d 222 (1967); Rogotzki v. Schept, 91 N.J. Super. 135,
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In Dark v. Fetzer8 plaintiff consulted the defendant, Dr. Fetzer,
in his capacity as an osteopathic physician. Upon examining the
plaintiff, Dr. Fetzer found it necessary to perform a hysterectomy and
to call in the second defendant, Dr. Sheets, for assistance. The operation resulted in the successful removal of a malignant tumor but
also resulted in the puncture of the left ureter causing irregular
drainage. The plaintiff later was readmitted to the hospital for a
second operation which failed to correct the irregularity. She was
finally referred to Dr. Reed Nesbit. At trial, plaintiff called Dr. Fetzer
to the stand and cross-examined him under the adverse witness
statute, but when plaintiff's counsel attempted to elicit expert opinion
testimony from the defendant, an objection was raised and sustained.
Judgment was entered for the defendant. On appeal the court found
that the purpose of the adverse witness statute is to level former
technical rules in order to arrive at the facts in issue. The court held
that the plaintiff should have been allowed to call the doctors as
adverse witnesses and to establish her case in chief through their
expert testimony.6
If this practice is to be allowed there are two important questions
peculiar to it that must be considered: 7 (i) Is it inconsistent for the
plaintiff to present the physician as competent to testify as an expert
witness, when by bringing the action he is attempting to discredit
the physician's medical competence? (2) If the plaintiff's position is
not inconsistent, will the court interpret the statute to require the
physician to present evidence adverse to his defense?
The first and major question to be resolved is that of the witness'
competency. In Ericksen v. Wilson8 the court held that the plaintiff
could not under the guise of the adverse witness statute force the de219 A.2d 426 (1966); McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 15
N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469 (1964).

16 Mich. App. 3o8, 149 N.W.2d

222 (1967).
Old.
at 224-25.
7
There is also the question of bias which is applicable to any testimony under
an adverse witness statute but which deserves some mention here. In Sturdivant Bank
v. Wright, 184 Mo. App. 164, 168 S.W. 355 (1914), an action on a note, defendant
was placed on the stand by plaintiff and examined as a witness on plaintiff's behalf.
Defendant testified that he had not signed the note; plaintiff subsequently asked
for an instruction to the jury pointing out that the defendant had an interest in
the suit and was biased. The court held that failure to give an instruction taking
the interest of the adverse party -into consideration was not reversible error. "[He
was the witness called and placed upon the stand and examined by plaintiff, and
it did not lie in the mouth of plaintiff to impeach or throw any slur in the
character of the witnesses whom it had itself produced and tendered to the jury
as a credible witness in the case." Id. at 357.
'266 ,Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
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fendant to become his expert witness. The court noted that this
procedure should be disallowed particularly where, as in a malpractice
action, the plaintiff is attempting to condemn the expertise of the
defendant. The court apparently viewed the plaintiff's efforts to have
the physician declared competent as a medical expert and incompetent
as a medical practitioner to be inconsistent. The apparent inconsistency in this position requires careful scrutiny of the defendantdoctor's qualifications as an expert. Thus, the standard for measuring
an expert's qualifications becomes particularly significant. If a common standard of qualifications can be found, this will at least supply
plaintiff with a means of proving one of his seemingly self-contradictory points.
The court in Dark required that the calling party present the
qualifications of the expert witness, but it did not mention standards
for qualification. The court stated,
Since there is no presumption that a witness is competent to
give an opinion, it is incumbent upon the party offering the
witness to show that the latter possesses the necessary learning,
knowledge, skill, or practical experience to enable him to give
opinion testimony. 9
According to Professor Wigmore 10 the only true criterion is: can a
jury receive appreciable help from the witness. In State v. Killeen"
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said,
The test, therefore, to determine whether the court erred when
it permitted the witness to testify [as an expert] ... is to inquire

whether there is any evidence from which it can be found that
his knowledge ... was such2 that his opinion might aid the jury
in determining that issue.'
In keeping with this rather lenient standard, the court in State v.
Brewer, 3 after allowing the judge to decide if the witness was qualified
(the general rule today) 14 said, "[I]f there is any evidence that a witness
is an expert, the decision of the court below will not be reviewed on
appeal."15
9149 N.W.2d at
'07 J. WIGafoRF,

225.
EVIDENCE § 1923 (3d ed. 1940).

u79 N.H. 2o, 107 A. 6ol (1919).
WId. at 6o2.
"202 N.C. 187, 162 S.E.

363

(1932).

"'Murray v. State, 214 Tenn. 51, 377 S.W.2d 918 (1964); Pruitt v. State, 216
Tenn. 687, 393 S.W.2d 747 (1965); State v. Brewer, 2o2 N.C. 187, 162 S.E. 363
(1932); State v. Cole, 67 Wash. 2d 522, 408 P.2d 387 (1965); State v. Moorer, 241 S.c.
487, 129 S.E.2d 3o (1963); State v. Percy, go SJ). 1, 117 N.W.2d 99 (1962); McNorton
v. State, 338 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 196o).
2162 S.E. at 364.
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Notwithstanding the suggestion of incompetency in Ericksen, it is
easily understandable that a physician could make a single mistake and
still be considered proficient in his profession. It is possible for a
doctor to make a medical mistake, or even be guilty of malpractice,
and still be qualified to testify as an expert witness under the standard
of Wigmore and State v. Killeen. The doctor would certainly have
sufficient medical knowledge to aid and inform the laymen of the
jury. Seemingly, the only time this would not be true is when a doctor
attempted treatment entirely out of his field.
On the question of the intent of the adverse witness statute to
require a defendant to render an expert opinion against himself, most
courts stand firmly and decisively on one side or the other. 16 Courts
not in accord with Dark' 7 usually reason that it is not the intent of an
adverse witness statute to allow a plaintiff to elicit expert opinion
"under the guise of the cross-examination."' 8 Prior to the enactment
of these statutes, the calling party was bound by the testimony of an
adverse witness and could not rebut such testimony by other evidence;
nor could he impeach the witness by showing contradictory statements
or lack of credibility under oath.' 9 Courts not in accord with Dark
hold that such statutes were enacted simply to alleviate this problem
and to allow the calling party to have the adverse party testify without
fear of being bound by his statements. 20 They reason that the statute
was not intended to make adverse expert-opinion permissible. With
this as the fundamental purpose of the statute, the courts seem to feel
that there is little room for misunderstanding and that the statute is
free from difficulty. These courts flatly reject the idea that the plaintiff
should be allowed to make out his case in full through the testimony
of the defendant-doctor.
In Osborn v. Carey2' the court was in diametric opposition to the
Dark rule when it said,
Where a witness is called under the provisions of [the adverse
witness statute] he may be examined by the adverse party as
if under cross-examination, subject to the rules applicable to the
examination of other witnesses, but it is contrary to the purpose
16
See Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 83, 842 (1952); Plank v.
Summers, 2o5 Md. 662, iog A.2d 914 (1954). It was held that whether the adverse
party witness testifies as an expert is within the discretion of the court.
' 7Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Osborn v. Carey,
24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944).
IsEricksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687, 691 (1963).
"State v. Tilley, 239 N.C. 245, 79 S.E.2d 473 (1952).
2nForthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
224 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913).
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and reason of that statute to allow the plaintiff to make out his
case in chief by expert opinion
evidence secured from the de22
fendant on cross-examination.
The court gave no reason for its decision other than interpretation of
the statute. However, it has been held that a defendant-physician cannot be required to give expert testimony because under the rules 'of
examination and cross-examination an expert may be asked for- his
testimony only when he has voluntarily contracted to give it.23. The leading case of Lawless v. Calaway24 involved a nalpractice
suit for defendant-physician's negligence in making an incorrect diagnosis of appendicitis which resulted in the death of plaintiff's minor
son. The case set the precedent for the modern trend toward allowing
the plaintiff to utilize the defendant as his expert witness. 25 The
court held that the defendant may be compelled to testify concerning
facts and opinion material to the case and therefore, may be called
to prove the entire case of the calling party. As pointed out in McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital,26 where plaintiff
lost sight in her left eye after an operation by defendant-doctor, it is
at least arguable that the doctor's knowledge of the standard of medical practice, as well as his knowledge of his own deviation from this
standard, become matters of "fact" rather than opinion when the
doctor testifies. In other words, an independent expert renders only
an opinion of whether the defendant's conduct was negligent, but the
defendant can testify "factually" as to whether his conduct was in
keeping with local standards. Therefore, it might be said that what
was traditionally rendered as expert opinion has now become fact
because of the expert's (defendant's) peculiar position in -the case.
Because of the traditional requirement that expert opinion testimony
is necessary to sustain plaintiff's case this theory results in plaintiff's
failure to prove his case. By viewing defendant's testimony as fact
rather than opinion, plaintiff would lack the expert opinion testimony
vital to his case and would be subject to non-suit. It is submitted, however, that classifying the defendant-physician's testimony as fact should
21d. at 970.
.Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944).
2424 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 6o4 (1944).
-Anderson v. Stump, 42 Cal. App. 2d 761, 109 P.2d 1027 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Scott v. Sciaroni, 66 Cal.
App. 577, 226 P. 827 (1924); Harnden v. Mischel, 6S NiD. 122, 246 N.W. 646 (1933);
Sax Motor Co. v. Belfield Farmer's Union Elevator Co., 62 NJ). 727, 245 N.W. 488
(1932); Rogotzki v. Schept, 91 'N.J. Super. 135, 219 A.2d 426 (1966); see Bolles v.
Kinton, 83 Co1. 147, 263 P. 26 (1928); Jacobs v. Grigsby, 187 Wis. 66o, 2o5 N.W.
394 (1925).
' 1 5 N.Y.2d 20, 2o3 N.E.2d 469 (1964).
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have no bearing on plaintiff's case. Admittedly, such a classification
would deviate slightly from the traditional requirement of expert
opinion testimony but it would comne much closer to fulfilling the
purpose of the requirement. The entire reason for requiring expert
opinion testimony is to discover if, in the opinion of the expert, the
defendant-physician's conduct was in keeping with the standards of
the medical community. An independent expert was called simply
because prior to the enactment of adverse witness statutes plaintiff
was not allowed to gain this information by examining the defendant.
Obviously, the defendant is in a better position to give this information than an independent expert and the purpose of the requirement
is better served by allowing this practice.
McDermott also held that the "obvious" underlying purpose of the
adverse witness rule is to allow the production of all relevant evidence
available from the parties. Furthermore, the court did not feel that
this practice was unfair. The defendant in a civil case, unlike his
counterpart in a criminal case, has no inherent right to remain silent
on questions that might adversely effect his case. Instead of remaining
silent, he must, if called as a witness, deliver even information that
may make out the plaintiff's case in full-including expert opinion
27
testimony.
Courts are intent upon arriving at just decisions and upon
employing properly expedient means to attain such an end. If
a defendant in a malpractice action may truthfully testify that
his conduct conformed to the standard required, his case is,
of course, substantially strengthened and, if he cannot so testify,
the plaintiff's chances of recovery are unquestionably increased.
In either28case, the objective of the court in doing justice is
achieved.
It is well known that the inability of a plaintiff to obtain the
indispensable part of a malpractice suit, expert medical testimony, is
quite often a major problem. There is inherent in this problem a
question of the propriety of soliciting one expert's (physician's) opinion
of another, a question of ethics, and a general reluctance among
physicians to comment adversely on their colleague's conduct.2 9 A

few doctors may be influenced by an "I may be next" feeling, fears
of revocation of their insurance, social ostracism, or restriction of
their practice. All of these reasons, coupled with the fact that the group
-Id.
'Id. at 474.
"See Belli, An Ancient Theraphy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, i ViLL. L. REV. 250 (1956);
9 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1957).

Note, The California Malpractice Controversy,

